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Fitting Square Pegs into Round Holes: Atlantic Coast Conference Member Institutional
Responses to NCAA Sanctions, 1986-2016
By Matt Arant
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Executive Summary
The current state of college athletics is a popular debate topic among many Americans.
Matters of athlete compensation and how large-scale commercialization has undermined
traditional notions of academic integrity and genuine amateurism are the most common topics
covered, but I decided to shift the conversation from the NCAA as a whole to the individual
institutions and conferences that grapple with the same issues. Using the Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC) from 1986-2016 as a sample, I wanted to both comprehend how specific
institutions respond to NCAA sanctions and the way the conference treats previously noncompliant programs when it undergoes expansion efforts. I created a three-pronged criterion for
institutional response: senior-level change, lower-level change, or no change. Using my best
judgment, alongside a bevy of primary sources, I designated which programs experienced
administrative change.
After evaluating all twenty-three cases, clear patterns of violations and sanctions were
present. Extra benefits and impermissible recruiting were the most popular form of violations
while probation and public reprimand/censure were the most common penalties levied by the
NCAA Infractions Committee. However, determining a pattern among institutional responses is
much more difficult. Despite the overwhelming number of cases that consisted of some
administrative change, the direct link between violations/sanctions and change in leadership were
found in only a few instances. High attrition rates are a fact of life for senior-level administrators
in both academia and athletics; resignations, retirements, new positions in different locales and
firings exist at all universities. The environment often masks this direct link between sanctions
and new leadership, a development that should be considered by advocates of athletic reform.
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Risky Business at Minardi Hall
In early February, University of Louisville President James Ramsey and Athletic Director
Tom Jurich decided to self-impose a one-year postseason ban (both conference and national
tournament) for the men’s basketball team. On first glance, the judgment issued by Ramsey and
Jurich stunned the city and the national college basketball community given Louisville’s
impressive record this season. However, the nature of the events led officials to make this
decision with the hopes of reducing the severity of future punishment (Greer, 2016). In early
April, Louisville underwent a second phase of self-punishment when they decided to reduce the
number of scholarships and recruiting visits by both coach Rick Pitino and the rest of his staff.
At the heart of this punishment were the allegations made by Katina Powell in which she
described “nearly two dozen stripping and sex parties from 2010 to 2014 inside Billy Minardi
Hall, the on-campus dorm for athletes and other students.” Powell told Outside the Lines that
Andre McGee, a former Cardinals player who was later promoted to director of basketball
operations, coordinated the parties and “paid her $10,000 for supplying dancers during the time
period; McGee also allegedly “supplied cash for ‘side deals,’ which included sex with some
recruits, guardians who accompanied them on visits and some Louisville players.” Five former
Cardinals players corroborated Powell’s account and McGee’s role in it (Barr and Goodman,
2015).
College Sports Scandals and Institutional Responses
If these allegations at Louisville are found to be true by the NCAA, then there is no
question that additional punishments will be given. However, to those who have followed
scandals in college sports, this pattern of bad behavior has largely become routine.
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Intercollegiate athletics have been mired with scandal and controversy for decades, but it was the
professionalization of coaches that ushered in this era of commercialization. Beginning with
Yale crew in 1864, the “saga of the professional coach does much to explode the myth that there
was ever a lengthy period when the amateur spirit pervaded college athletics” (Smith 1986, 147).
The state of commercialization in college sports has adapted over time, but programs have
constantly been looking for ways to gain an advantage over their rivals. In the last decade alone,
the NCAA has issued sixty five reports of major violations, with thirty-nine of them coming
from schools in “Power Five” conferences (ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12, and SEC).
While so much has been written about the ills of NCAA when it comes to athlete
compensation and the plethora of scandals rocking colleges and universities across the country, a
dearth of literature has focused on institutional responses to these scandals. Using the Atlantic
Coast Conference as an example, I seek to understand the next steps taken by ACC member
institutions after the NCAA issues reports detailing specific violations and their accompanied
penalties. Furthermore, with conference expansion as the norm rather than the exception, I also
will examine new entrants to the ACC over time and determine how conference leadership
viewed their prior records of rule breaking and whether this impacted their membership to the
conference.
Scapegoats and “Keeping up with the Joneses”: Prior Work on Institutional Reactions to
NCAA Sanctions
The primary focus of this paper is to identify potential patterns among institutions in how
they respond to NCAA sanctions for rules violations, but it warrants mentioning how scholars
perceive NCAA enforcement and how this perception has evolved over time.
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NCAA Enforcement in General
Scholars initially examined NCAA enforcement for years through the lens of
emphasizing the system’s numerous flaws. The potential conflict of interests present between
enforcement staff and the NCAA’s Infraction Committee, questionable protocols for recording
testimony by investigators, the apparent one-sided nature of the flow of information, and lack of
sanction consistency were just a few of the issues posed by researchers (Gopelrud, 1991).
However, the scope later shifted to studying how NCAA enforcement influences competitive
balance in different sports, specifically football. Researchers using panel data from eleven major
Division 1 football conferences found that greater levels of enforcement in a conference improve
competitive balance but the greater severity of punishment reduces competitive balance, thereby
determining that the net effect of enforcement improves competitive balance (Depken and
Wilson, 2006).
Despite Depken and Wilson’s conclusion of enforcement leading to greater balance
among programs, many others posit that the NCAA is guilty of practicing “selective
enforcement,” a process that “targets the least successful schools for investigation while turning
a blind eye to the most successful institutions because they generate a bulk of the national
interest, and, therefore, a bulk of the revenue” (Byers quoted in Otto 1995, 40). Yet, others
propose another iteration of selective enforcement where the NCAA “goes after the most
successful programs because they attract the most media attention; therefore, they are more
closely scrutinized” (Zimbalist quoted in Otto 1999, 40).
The aura of confusion and contradiction surrounding NCAA enforcement leads to
interesting arguments of due process. This due process argument exists on two planes: the
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concept of selective enforcement itself and when the actual sanctions are handed down. Cases of
documented wrongdoing by athletic programs take several years to compile. Once the mandates
from the Infractions Committee are finally handed down, it adversely impacts athletes who had
no involvement with the violations outlined by the committee, creating a retroactive system of
punishment.
Scapegoats
Scapegoating is the practice of assigning blame or undeserved negative treatment to one
specific individual or group of individuals. Scapegoating occurs in virtually every segment of
society, but it occupies a special place when it comes to sports. Hallowed discussion of curses
and jinxes surround teams across the country, especially those teams who have not experienced
success for a significant amount of time. What should team executives do in this situation?
Often, they opt for a change in management by firing a head coach or manager, a development
chronicled by William Gamson and Norman Scotch in 1964.
Using Major League Baseball managers as their test subjects, Gamson and Scotch
proposed three explanations for the succession-effectiveness relationship initially articulated by
Oscar Grusky. The first explanation was designated the common-sense one-way causality theory;
essentially, the manager understands that his competence is a chief influencer of team
performance. If the team performs poorly, the manager is ultimately held responsible, dismissed,
and replaced by another manager with the expectation of raising team performance. Grusky’s
two-way causality theory also supports the claim that managers greatly influence team
performance but with reversed repercussions. A change in management “inevitably upsets old
patterns of behavior” and “new organizational policies produce changes of great magnitude in
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the internal structure of the team.” Third, the ritual scapegoat no-way causality theory largely
discounts the impact a manager has on team performance; rather, the talent on the field is the
most important indicator of success (Gamson and Scotch 1964, 69-70). The issue of
scapegoating figures largely in assessing institutional responses to NCAA sanctions also.
Whenever a program is found to have committed recruiting violations or academic dishonesty,
what is the next step? Do they insulate senior-level officials (head coaches, athletic directors,
presidents) from blame and sever ties with tutors, advisors, assistant coaches/recruiters or
acknowledge that accountability is a top-down rather than bottom-up approach? Additionally,
when these punishments finally go into effect, current players become scapegoats because they
are negatively impacted by the sins of their predecessors.
Conspicuous Consumption and “Keeping Up with the Joneses” in College Athletics
The American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen is most famous for coining
the phrase “conspicuous consumption,” which is the behavior of spending money on unnecessary
luxury goods as a means of displaying apparent affluence (Veblen, 1899). Closely related to
conspicuous consumption is the idea of “keeping up with the Joneses,” a phenomenon where
comparing financial success with one’s peers was the key measure of social class: failing to
“keep up” was (and in most respects, still is) a mark of inferiority. This comparative tool for
success has been implemented as a means of motivation for university athletics departments for
decades, but only recently has the extravagant spending by programs gained traction and
visibility in popular circles.
Will Hobson and Steve Rich at the Washington Post requested from athletic departments
at all 53 public schools affiliated with “Power Five” conferences financial records for 2004 and

8

2014 to chart potential trends in athletics department spending. They found that over this tenyear period the combined income of all departments nearly doubled to $4.5 billion, but twentyfive departments still ran a deficit for 2014. Despite the apparent contradiction of unprecedented
revenues coupled with a substantial number of programs “ending up in the red,” Veblen’s theory
effectively explains why this is the case. Universities such as Alabama, Texas, Ohio State, and
Florida are often lumped together as the “1 Percent” of college athletics, but officials at less
lucrative programs compete in arms races for better facilities and high-quality coaches in order to
remain competitive with these behemoths. Desire to draw the best recruits and keep the most
accomplished athletes eligible is another manifestation of “keeping up with the Joneses” among
athletics departments and can lead to considerable consequences such as NCAA sanctions
(Hobson and Rich, 2015).
Research Design
In determining how colleges and universities respond to NCAA sanctions for major
violations including the improper payment of athletes via monetary/non-monetary benefits and
instances of academic fraud, I opted for a qualitative approach of analysis with the goal of
identifying patterns among the studied institutions.
Data
I used the NCAA’s Legislative Services Database for major infractions case searches.
Dating back to January 1, 1953, this database allows for individuals to search for NCAA reports
of major violations by individual school, conference, division, penalty type, and sport
(https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch). I decided to look at just one “Power Five”
conference, the 15-school Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), over a specific time period (1986-
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2016). I decided to select the ACC because of its large institutional variance and general
academic superiority when compared to similar conferences. Enrollments range from around
6,500 at Duke to 41,000 at Florida State with six members being privately affiliated. Moreover,
most of these schools are often regarded as being some of the nation’s best. This significant
degree of variation may lead to different plans of action by institutions because of their differing
missions. However, this intra-conference variation may be overcome by the general
characteristics (notably athletic facility budgets and administrative compensation) found among
Power Five conference members when compared to non-Power Five conferences, leading to
some sense of generalizability.
The year 1986 is crucial in the history of the NCAA because the Supreme Court recently
ruled that existing television contracts violated antitrust law. Subsequently, college sports began
to commercialize at levels never before seen, and I argue that this shift potentially led to coaches
and other members affiliated with athletic departments to engage in behavior at odds with certain
NCAA bylaws.
Methodology
After applying parameters for conference and time period to the database, I found that
ACC member schools had twenty-three major infractions cases. Due to the tumultuous nature of
conference realignment and for the sake of clarity, I am only including current members of the
ACC (even if they committed violations while a part of another conference). Because this is a
qualitative analysis, I will be initially classifying all twenty-three cases based on school, year,
and sport alongside the most “popular” violations committed by the program and penalties
imposed by the NCAA. Additionally, I illustrate via primary sources such as media guides how
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these individual institutions responded to NCAA sanctions. I have created a set of criteria for
classifying institutional response: change in senior-level administration, change in lower-level
administration, and accepting the decision and pursuing no further action. Finally, I include
which schools committed major violations prior to being admitted to the ACC with the goal of
explaining the potential effect committing major violations has on a program looking to
“upgrade” conferences. By specifying these schools, I hope to leave readers with a pressing
question: how much is a conference willing to sacrifice in terms of academic prestige and
integrity for allowing successful and profitable yet delinquent programs into its ranks?
Note on Sources
Because this particular analysis required quite a bit of personal data collection, I
consulted available media guides for all ACC member universities that received some NCAA
sanction report in the established timeline. This allowed me to determine who the head coaches
were at the time of both the alleged violations and release of NCAA sanction reports. If there
was a change in leadership, I then cross referenced these names with news articles written at the
time which would offer a better indicator of whether recently-issued sanctions contributed to this
change. Regarding university presidents, I consulted individual universities’ “Office of the
President” webpages which contained lists of past presidents and then conducted the same crossreferencing procedure. For example, the University of Miami following the 1995 NCAA report
experienced an administrative shakeup in their football program. Head coaches (two) and athletic
directors (two) during the time period of the alleged violations (1985-1994) left the university;
some resigned, others took positions elsewhere. In order to effectively determine what
specifically led to these changes, I had to consult relevant Miami Herald articles. In terms of
lower-level changes, the infractions committee directly listed these in the reports because this
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was often part of the university’s process of self-corrective action prior to the final report being
released.
Findings and Discussion
Table 1: Report Breakdown
School

Year

Sport

Clemson

1990, 1992

FB (1990); MBB (1992)

Florida State

1996, 2009

FB (1996); FB, MWBB, MT, Base, MWS, MG, Soft (2009)

Georgia Tech

1989, 2005, 2011,

MT (1989); FB, MWCC, MWT, MWS (2005); MBB, FB

2014

(2011); FB, MWBB (2014)

Louisville

1996, 1998

MBB (1996); MBB, VB (1998)

Miami

1995, 2003, 2013

FB, WG, Base, MT (1995); Base (2003); FB, MBB (2013)

North Carolina

2012

FB (2012)

North Carolina State

1989

MBB (1989)

Notre Dame

1999

FB (1999)

Pittsburgh

1993

FB, MBB (1993)

Syracuse

1992, 2015

FB, MWBB, MLax, MWrest (1992); FB, MBB (2015)

Virginia

1993

FB (1993)

Virginia Tech

1987, 1993

FB, MBB (1987); MWCC (1993)

Wake Forest

1994

MBB (1994)

Key: FB=Football, MBB=Men’s Basketball, WBB=Women’s Basketball, MT=Tennis, WT=Women’s Tennis Base=Baseball,
MS=Men’s Swimming, WS=Women’s Swimming, MG= Men’s Golf, WG=Women’s Golf, Soft=Softball, MCC=Men’s Cross
Country, WCC=Women’s Cross Country, VB=Volleyball, MLax=Men’s Lacrosse, MWrest=Men’s Wrestling
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Table 1 shows just how extensively a major rules violation scandal can plague an athletic
conference. During this time period, thirteen of the fifteen member schools committed some type
of major rules violation; only Duke and Boston College remained unscathed. Football and men’s
basketball were the two most penalized sports; of the twenty-three cases, fifteen involved
football and thirteen involved men’s basketball. This should not come as too big of a surprise
when considering the large amount of media exposure devoted to these two particular sports.
However, several “non-revenue generating” sports engaged in significant wrongdoing during this
time as well, dispelling the common perception that just football and basketball programs take
unacceptable liberties with NCAA rules and regulations.
Table 2: Most Popular Violations and NCAA Penalties
Violation

Penalty

1. Extra benefits (16 cases)

1. Probation (21 cases)

2. Impermissible Recruiting (14 cases)

2. Public Reprimand (21 cases)

3. Lack of Institutional Control (9 cases)

3. Compliance Reports (17 cases)

4. Unethical Conduct (8 cases)

4. Scholarship Reduction (15 cases)

5. Improper Financial Aid/ Failure to

5. Re-Certification (12 cases)

Monitor (tied with 6 cases)

Table 2 lists the five most frequent types of violations committed by ACC member
schools and penalties levied by the NCAA Committee on Infractions. In terms of violations,
extra benefits and impermissible recruiting are clearly the most popular over this time period.
These two offenses are somewhat related in that it often involves providing athletes with items in
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excess of their scholarship and stipend, and this practice may include both prospective and
current athletes. Benefits can range from small amounts of cash or gifts to luxurious items such
as jewelry, high-end clothing, airfare, fine dining, air travel, or tickets to marquee prizefights.
Impermissible recruiting may include offering prospective athletes extra benefits, but this term is
more all-encompassing. Illegally contacting recruits via telephone, email, text messaging, or in
person as well as being present for “tryouts” or workout sessions with recruits can be classified
under this umbrella of improper or impermissible recruiting. While extra benefits and recruiting
violations are often committed by lower-level athletics department officials, the other three
violations most often cited in the selected NCAA reports (lack of institutional control, unethical
conduct, and failure to monitor) carry with them an aura of indicting senior management for
negligent behavior. An allegation of failure to monitor or a general lack of institutional control
can be construed as an organizational “scarlet letter,” yet this designation does not always yield a
head coach or athletic director’s dismissal from the college or university.
The types of penalties levied by the NCAA were pretty uniform; from a possible twentythree cases, twenty-one required probation (1-5 years) and a public reprimand/censure. It appears
that this form of punishment was the actual report itself, with the NCAA making the change in
the late 1980s. It bears noting that periodic compliance reports detailing suitable progress being
made by departments and reductions of scholarships were required in the overwhelming majority
of the cases studied. Re-certification is essentially an accrediting process undertaken by
compliant athletic departments every 10 years, but this process may have to be repeated
following violations. Finally, highly severe penalties decided by the NCAA such as a postseason
ban or vacating of wins or individual records were present in some cases, six and eight
respectively.
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Now What? Next Steps for Programs
While violations and their successive penalties followed a general pattern at ACC
programs from 1986 to the present, it is much more difficult to pinpoint a distinct “playbook”
used by schools following the issuing of these sanctions. Higher education administration and
intercollegiate athletics are atmospheres rife with high turnover; coaches and athletic directors
are fired for lackluster performance, take positions at new institutions with the hopes of
“upgrading” his or her situation for not only financial reasons but also enhancing individual
reputation, retire, or resign for other reasons. Due to this wide variety of possible changes in
leadership, the existence of a definite link between the culpable program and the change in head
coach, athletic director, or even university president is tenuous at best. (Table 2 in the Appendix
details both senior-level and lower-level administrative change for each case in the 1986-2016
timeframe).
The first three cases from this study (Virginia Tech football and men’s basketball,
Georgia Tech men’s tennis, and North Carolina State men’s basketball) offered examples of
substantive steps taken by these universities’ athletics departments to prevent future wrongdoing.
After allegations of improper employment, academic fraud, and extra benefits, Virginia Tech’s
head football coach and athletic director Bill Dooley and head basketball coach Charles Moir
resigned from their respective positions. Additionally, university president William Lavery
resigned shortly after the report detailing violations was released by the NCAA. A similar chain
of events occurred within Georgia Tech’s tennis program with the swift resignation of the team’s
head coach and top assistant, and N.C. State’s head men’s basketball coach and athletic director
Jim Valvano (of 1983 NCAA championship fame) was forced to relinquish his athletic director
duties in 1989 and resigned as head coach the following year. During the late 1980s the national
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media began exhaustively chronicling serious abuses occurring in the athletic programs at
Kentucky, Maryland, and Oklahoma, so the decision to distance themselves from the leaders of
delinquent programs could be viewed as an effective public relations decision (Thelin, 1996).
Yet, some of these departed administrators found new positions almost immediately,
even within the same institution. Dooley was named the next head coach at Wake Forest in 1987,
Lavery became honorary chancellor and professor of international affairs at Virginia Tech in
1987, and North Carolina State’s Chancellor Bruce Poulton led the university’s Literacy Systems
Center in 1989. Starting in 1990, the pattern of institutional response can be best described as
sporadic: some schools made clean breaks with senior athletic officials (North Carolina football
in 2010) while others either fled the program for new positions (Miami football in early 1990s)
or largely stayed intact (Syracuse men’s basketball in late 1980s and currently). Despite the lack
of meaningful action at some programs, in the majority of cases lower-level participants in
wrongdoing were quickly dismissed as a direct result of their duties at the university; this
included not only assistant coaches and members of recruiting staffs but also tutors, academic
advisors, and operations assistants. To further understand how universities respond to NCAA
scandals, a more in-depth analysis of the nine cases where “lack of institutional control”
violations were found is necessary.
The Neglectful Nine
Clemson, Georgia Tech, Louisville, Miami (twice), North Carolina State, Syracuse
(twice), and Virginia all were hit with “lack of institutional control” violations, but each program
appeared to try different forms of corrective action. With the exception of N.C. State, no head
coach, athletic director, or university president at any of these schools either resigned or were
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fired as a direct result of NCAA findings of rules violations. However, this does not mean that
senior-level administrators remained at their respective schools. Continuing with the widely held
description of college athletics as a “dog eat dog” world and how high attrition rates are a fact of
life, nearly all of the other eight universities experienced significant changes. For example, the
University of Miami was the sight of two particularly shocking scandals: one included school
officials fraudulently securing over $200,000 in Pell Grants for athletes and the other involved
the multi-year exploits of Hurricane “super booster” and Ponzi schemer Nevin Shapiro. For the
early case, head football coaches Jimmy Johnson and Dennis Erickson left for new positions
with the NFL while then-current athletic directors became the General Manager of the New
England Patriots and the Director of Sports for the 1996 Olympics, respectively. Syracuse,
however, is the notable exception, specifically within its men’s basketball program. Despite two
major investigations into alleged academic fraud and extra benefits, the program’s head coach
Jim Boeheim has stayed with the school for over forty five years (forty as head coach). One
hallmark characteristic of the ACC has been its efforts to expand its conference membership, so
this adds another wrinkle to the issue of how different institutions handle reports of NCAA
sanctions.
Non-Charter Members and History of NCAA Violations
Founded in 1953, the ACC consisted of eight original members: Clemson, Duke,
Maryland (now part of the Big Ten) North Carolina, North Carolina State, South Carolina (now
part of the SEC), Virginia, and Wake Forest. Over time, the ACC was caught in the nationwide
whirlwind of conference realignment and expansion. Table 3 displays new members of the ACC
and their history of violations via conference affiliation at the time of NCAA sanctions.
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Table 3: Expansion Members and Violations
School

Conference at Time of Violation

Boston College (2005)

No violations committed in time period

Florida State (1991)

ACC (after admission to conference)

Georgia Tech (1979)

ACC (after admission to conference)

***Louisville (2014)

Metro, Conference USA

***Miami (2004)

Independent/Big East, Big East, ACC

Notre Dame (2013)

Independent

Pittsburgh (2013)

Independent

***Syracuse (2013)

Big East, Big East/ACC

Virginia Tech (2004)

Metro/Independent, Metro

Eight of the nine expansion schools committed NCAA violations over the thirty-year
period analyzed, but three in particular deserve special consideration. With the sanctions around
Louisville’s misconduct still pending, the decision to admit troubled programs such as Syracuse
and Miami into the conference is worth discussing. The exploits of Miami’s football program are
well-documented, but the Hurricanes were highly successful on the field, winning bowl games
and national championships and producing large amounts of revenue as a member of the Big
East conference (Hurricanes football was independently affiliated prior to 1990). This success
made the university a prime target for conference expansion, especially for those conferences
that wanted nationally competitive football programs. From performance and revenue generating
standpoints, this was a no-brainer; adding Miami to the ACC would easily achieve the
conference’s goal of being more than just a “basketball conference.” Yet, in the years following
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Miami’s admittance to the ACC, their football program has gone 81-57, a sharp contrast to their
128-29 record in the Big East. The presence of well-established football programs in the ACC
such as (also non-charter member) Florida State may have contributed to this decline in success,
but this decision to overlook substantive bad behavior by the Hurricanes athletics department and
their football team specifically in order to achieve greater conference prestige was a major
gamble to take in the eyes of reform-minded administrators.
Furthermore, Syracuse’s recent admission to the ACC was a byproduct of the “original”
Big East disbanding in 2013. As the vetting process for Syracuse joining the ACC was
underway, highly publicized events were taking place in the university’s men’s basketball
program, specifically the eligibility of center Fab Melo. Essentially in 2012 senior officials in the
basketball program, including the director of operations, conspired to keep Melo academically
eligible during one of Syracuse’s most successful years with the hopes of a deep March
tournament run. Academic fraud became one of the charges levied against Syracuse in the
recently released report of NCAA sanctions, but the events surrounding Melo’s eligibility was
known to the public at the time of Syracuse’s admission to the ACC.
Conclusions and Limitations
The pattern of violations and sanctions is pretty clear from studying the ACC over a
thirty-year period. Extra benefits given to recruits and current players and improper recruiting are
the most often-cited violations in NCAA reports, but lack of institutional control and failure to
monitor also figure prominently throughout this time frame. Probation and regular compliance
reports are a couple of the most used sanctions by the NCAA, with postseason bans and vacating
wins/records issued less frequently. Despite these apparent patterns, institutional responses have
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much more variation. Using my three-outcome model (change in senior-level administration,
change in lower-level administration, no change), I found that schools largely vary in how they
handle NCAA sanctions. Some schools like North Carolina and North Carolina State swiftly
removed all individuals associated with the alleged wrongdoing while schools like Miami or
Syracuse either did nothing or underwent administrative change involving coaches or athletic
directors taking positions elsewhere and facing no disciplinary action for their role in NCAA
violations. The high rate of attrition often masks this concrete effect of NCAA sanctions on job
security because most people simply read countless stories of coaches or athletic directors being
fired or resigning and fail to look deeper.
Because this is a case study analysis, there exist potential generalizability concerns.
Studying the issue of responses to NCAA sanctions through only one conference over one time
period makes it difficult for researchers to definitively state a connection between sanctions and
administrative change. However, the ACC is a pretty diverse conference in terms of enrollment,
geography, and public/private affiliation, so these cases may be better to illustrate the ostensible
variation among schools than a more homogenous conference such as the SEC or Big 10.
Additionally, the concept of selective enforcement itself may adversely impact the findings of
this study because some investigations may not have even taken place, indicating an
inconsistency of investigating wrongdoing.
As a senior-level athletic administrator, I would feel at ease with the results provided.
Despite the large numbers of cases with administrative change, the number of instances where
university presidents, athletic directors, and head coaches were either fired or forced to resign
were relatively rare in this sample. Even after some resignations, senior-level administrators
were gainfully employed at another institution or another department within the same institution.
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Those that face the greatest brunt of sanctions however are the student-athletes who are members
of non-compliant programs and lower-level staffers who may have directly committed the
violations but whose employment prospects are bleaker than their senior-level counterparts.
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Appendix
Table 1: ACC Member Characteristics
School

Location

Year

Affiliation

Established
Boston College

Chestnut Hill, MA

1863

Undergraduate
Enrollment

Private

14,500

(Catholic)
Clemson

Clemson, SC

1889

Public

19,453

Duke

Durham, NC

1838

Private

6,247

Florida State

Tallahassee, FL

1851

Public

41,000

Georgia Tech

Atlanta, GA

1885

Public

19,393

Louisville

Louisville, KY

1798

Public

22,000

Miami

Coral Gables, FL

1925

Private

15,520

North Carolina

Chapel Hill, NC

1789

Public

26,878

North Carolina State

Raleigh, NC

1887

Public

29,957

Notre Dame

South Bend, IN

1842

Private

11,985

(Catholic)
Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh, PA

1787

Public

35,330

Syracuse

Syracuse, NY

1870

Private

21,029

Virginia

Charlottesville, VA

1819

Public

20,399

Virginia Tech

Blacksburg, VA

1872

Public

28,000

Wake Forest

Winston-Salem, NC

1834

Private

7,152

**Enrollment figures courtesy of school profile pages on http://www.theacc.com/ **
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Table 2: Institutional Response Criteria
School

Year

Change in Senior-Level Admin

Change in Lower-Level Admin

Clemson

1990, 1992

Y (1990), N (1992)

Y (1990), Y (1992)

Florida State

1996, 2009

Y (1996), Y (2009)

N (1996), Y (2009)

Georgia Tech

1989, 2005, 2011,

Y (1989), Y (2005), Y (2011), N

Y (1989), N (2005), Y (2011), Y

(2014)

(2014)

Y (1996), N (1998)

Y (1996), Y (1998)

Y (1995), Y (2003), Y (2013)

N (1995), N (2003), N (2013)

2014
Louisville

1996, 1998

Miami

1995, 2003, 2013

North Carolina

2012

Y (2012)

Y (2012)

North Carolina State

1989

Y (1989)

N (1989)

Notre Dame

1999

N (1999)

Y (1999)

Pittsburgh

1993

N (1993)

Y (1993)

Syracuse

1992, 2015

Y (1992), Y (2015)

Y (1992), Y (2015)

Virginia

1993

N (1993)

N (1993)

Virginia Tech

1987, 1993

Y (1987), Y (1993)

N (1987), N (1993)

Wake Forest

1994

N (1994)

Y (1994)

**Note: 16 of 23 cases contained some type of senior-level administrative change; 14 of 23 cases
contained some type of lower-level administrative change

